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Perhaps the most important theological question ever asked is the one Christ 
asked his disciples as they were entering Caesarea Philippi: "who do you say that 
I am?"1 If we affirm with St. Peter that Jesus is "the Christ, the son of the living 
God,"2 then the following question naturally arises: since Jesus Christ is the Son 
of God, what does it mean for him to be both God and man? Indeed, one might 
say that most theological debates throughout church history have been either 
directly or indirectly dealing with the church's affirmation of St. Peter's words. 
One such debate - the subject of this paper - was the Monophysite controversy. 
This controversy was centered around the question of whether Christ in his 
incarnation had two natures or just one. A pivotal event in this controversy was 
the Council of Chalcedon which affirmed that Christ had two natures. Sadly, 
however, this council resulted in a schism which still lasts today between those 
churches that accepted the belief in two natures and those that did not. The 
Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and most Protestant 
Churches belong to the former group; and the Coptic and Armenian Orthodox 
churches and the Jacobite Syrian Church, which are commonly called the 
Oriental Orthodox or Monophysites, belong to the latter group. Although there 
were many reasons (cultural, political, linguistic, &c) contributing to the 
Monophysites' rejection of Chalcedon , I am only going to focus on their 
theological reasons for rejecting the council. As will be seen, the Monophysites’ 
rejection of the Council of Chalcedon stems more from a disagreement with how 
the fathers at the council chose to formulate their definition of faith rather than 
any fundamental difference in what they or the fathers were trying to express 
regarding Christ’s incarnation; both parties were trying to affirm that Christ was 
consubstantial with God and consubstantial with mankind while remaining one 
unified person. 
 
In order to properly understand the Council of Chalcedon and why the 
Monophysites rejected it, our attention must briefly turn to Nestorianism, Cyril 
of Alexandria, and Eutychianism. Twenty years prior to the Council of 
Chalcedon, the Council of Ephesus ended the Nestorian controversy. 
Nestorianism was a Christological heresy which said that Christ was composed 
of two separate natures each with their own person. The main opponent of 
Nestorianism was Cyril of Alexandria, and the problem he saw with 
Nestorianism was that it divided Christ in two. Thus, a key feature of his 
Christology was its insistence on the personal unity of Christ, which he described 
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with the phrase: “μὶα φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη.”3 St. Cyril usually 
considered the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις, and πρόσοπον to be equivalent, and 
what he designated by them was “concrete individuality, a living, concrete unity, 
a ‘person.’”4 Along with stressing Christ's personal unity, St. Cyril was careful 
not to conflate the divine and human aspects of Christ into a new substance.5 
After his death, however, one of his followers, an archimandrite in 
Constantinople named Eutyches, was accused of mixing the divine and human 
in Christ because he would not admit that Christ's humanity was consubstantial 
with mankind.6 The accusation of Eutyches and his later condemnation initiated 
events that would lead to the Council of Chalcedon which wanted to protect 
against any kind of confusion between the divine and human in Christ 
(Eutychainism). However, the fathers at the council also wanted to protect 
against dividing Christ like Nestorianism which they believed “was a force more 
dangerous to the Church than Monophysitism.”7 Moreover, the fathers gathered 
at Chalcedon wanted to remain faithful to St. Cyril whom they regarded as such 
an authority on Christology that they thoroughly examined Pope Leo I’s “tome” 
to make sure that it was in agreement with St. Cyril’s Christology before they 
accepted it.8 
 
Given this background information, we are now prepared to look at how 
the council's definition accomplished its theological aims. The first part of the 
definition reads: 
 
...we all with one voice confess our Lord Jesus Christ one and the same 
Son, the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in manhood...the same 
consisting of a reasonable soul and body...the same...born from the Virgin 
Mary, the Theotokos, as touching the manhood...9 
 
                                                 
3 Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 8, The Byzantine Fathers of the 
Fifth Century. Edited by Richard S. Haugh. Translated by Raymond Miller, Anne-Marie 
Dollinger-Labriolle, and Helmut Wilhelm Schmiedel. (Vaduz, Europa: Büchervertriebsanstalt, 
1987), 286. 
4 Ibid., 286. 
5 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought. (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1975), 21. 
6 Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 8, The Byzantine Fathers of the 
Fifth Century, 291. 
7 Meyendorff, 27, quoted from V.V. Bolotov, Lektsii po istorii drevnei Tserkvi, IV, 3, (Petrograd, 
1918), 317. 
8 Ibid., 27. 
9 Ibid., 26. 
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As is readily apparent, the Chalcedonian definition repeatedly uses "the same" 
when referring to the subject of the divine and human qualities of Christ to 
indicate that the subject is one and the same entity or person; this usage is 
significant because it is a guard against Nestorianism, and it demonstrates the 
faithfulness of the fathers present at the council to St. Cyril's insistence on the 
unity of Christ. The definition then continues with its most important section: 
 
...one and the same Christ, Son, Lord Only-begotten, to be acknowledged 
in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, 
without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way abolished 
because of the union but rather the characteristic property of each nature 
being preserved, and concurring into one person [πρόσοπον] and one 
hypostasis, not as if Christ were parted or divided into two persons, but 
one and the same Son and Only-begotten God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ...10 
 
The most significant feature of this section is the distinction made between 
person (ὑπόστασις) and nature (φύσις), which Fr. John Meyendorff describes as 
“Chalcedon’s essential and original contribution to Christology.”11 This 
distinction is important because it allowed the fathers at the council the ability to 
discuss both the singular and dual aspects of Christ.12 That is to say, Christology 
now had an explicit language with which it could precisely signify the “who” of 
Christ and “what” the “who” was. Thus, the fathers could more precisely guard 
against conflating the dual aspects of Christ since they had removed from φύσις 
any notion of concrete individuality or subsistence, and instead regarded it more 
abstractly. Simply put, what the council was trying to affirm about Christ is that 
he is one "who" (a person) who possesses two "whats" (a divine and human 
nature) that are united together under a single subject of reference (his person) 
but not mixed together into a new nature or substance. 
 
It is clear from the preceding that the Chalcedonian definition explicitly 
condemned any kind of Nestorianism; however, the Monophysites still rejected 
it. To help understand this rejection, our attention will now turn to the objections 
of Severus of Antioch who, as Fr. Georges Florovsky notes, was "one of the most 
important persons and the most important theologian of the non-
Chalcedonians;"13 and whose " theological system also became the official 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 26. 
11 Ibid., 24. 
12 Ibid., 28. 
13 Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 9, The Byzantine Fathers of the 
Sixth to Eighth Century. Edited by Richard S. Haugh. Translated by Raymond Miller, Anne-Marie 
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doctrine of the Syrian Jacobites, of the Coptic Christians in Egypt and of the 
Armenian Church."14 However, before proceeding to Severus, it should be noted 
that the Monophysites viewed themselves as the defenders of Cyril’s faith, and 
Monophysite theologians such as Severus of Antioch and Philoxenus of 
Hierapolis would codify Cyril’s Christology;15 as such, they were adamant about 
not deviating from anything of Cyril's, even the words he used and how he used 
them; thus, they considered φύσις and ὑπόστασις to be equivalent terms.  As we 
proceed, this equivalency and the Chalcedonian definition's use of the phrase "in 
two natures" to indicate that Christ had two natures after the union should thus 
be kept in mind. 
 
In the second part of his work against Nephalius (a former non-
Chalcedonian), Severus lists some of his objections to the Chalcedonian 
definition. At the beginning of this work he provides a statement of faith: 
 
Now we ourselves,...believe...and confess that the only-begotten Son of 
God, who is equal in essence to the Father...,came down at the end of days 
and became incarnate and was made man - that is, he was united to flesh 
which had a soul possessed of reason and intelligence by means of a free 
and hypostatic union from the holy Spirit and from the ever-virgin Mary, 
Mother of God; and that his nature was one, even when the Word had 
become incarnate...and we know him as simple, and not as compound, in 
that which he is understood to be God, and composite in that which he is 
understood to be man.16 
 
Except his remarks about one nature, much of Severus's language is very similar 
to that of the Chalcedonian definition; however, Severus is completely lacking 
any specific term with which he can describe Christ's divine and human aspects; 
the best he can do is say "that which." Yet it is clear that he is trying to affirm that 
Christ is fully God and fully man. He continues: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dollinger-Labriolle, and Helmut Wilhelm Schmiedel. (Vaduz, Europa: Büchervertriebsanstalt, 
1987), 104. 
14 Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 8, The Byzantine Fathers of the 
Fifth Century, 327. 
15 Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 9, The Byzantine Fathers of the 
Sixth to Eighth Century, 35-36. 
16 Severus of Antioch, Severus of Antioch: The Early Church Fathers, ed. and trans. Pauline Allen and 
C.T.R. Hayward (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 59. 
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...For since we believe him to be Emmanuel, even the same God the Word 
incarnate out of two natures which possess integrity (I mean out of 
divinity and out of humanity), we know one Son, one Christ, one Lord. 
We do not affirm that he is known in two natures, as the Synod of 
Chalcedon declared as dogma....17 
 
There are two interesting things going on in this passage. The first is Severus' 
subtle distinction between the phrases "out of two natures" and "in two natures," 
and the second is the connection between affirming the unity of Christ and 
denying two natures. Severus' then gives his reasons for why he prefers the 
phrase "out of two natures" instead of "in two natures":  
 
For the phrase 'out of two natures' in fact denies that they are two, and 
demonstrates that he himself is one through composition, and that those 
things out of which he was compounded as the same Lord did not cease to 
exist because they were joined together without confusion; and that same 
one continues firm and unshaken after the sublime union. That formula, 
which is expressed as 'two (natures) after the union' is one of those things 
which have no substance: for if two persisted, they would not be united, 
since union is that which erases duality.18 
 
As is clear from this passage, Severus is not opposed to speaking about two 
natures per se, but rather saying that there are two natures after the union, which 
is indicated by the phrase “in two natures,” because it seems to introduce a 
division in Christ; he is otherwise in agreement with Chalcedon that it is the 
same unified subject after the union as before the union and that there is no 
conflation between the divine and human attributes of Christ; but again, he lacks 
a specific term to designate "those things out of which he [Christ] was 
compounded." Moreover, Severus' objection to the phrase "in two natures" or 
that thee are two natures after the union is predicated upon maintaining that the 
terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις mean the same thing, namely, person. Throughout 
the preceding passages, this equivalency has been implied, but Severus explicitly 
states it later in his work: 
 
But it is plain to all those who are even moderately educated and learned 
in the dogmas of orthodoxy that it is the nature of a contradiction to say 
concerning the one Christ that on the one hand there are two natures, but 
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on the other one hypostasis. For the person who speaks of 'one hypostasis' 
necessarily affirms one nature as well.19 
 
For Severus, the Chalcedonian definition by its very wording either eradicates 
Christ's unity because it is supposedly saying that Christ is two persons 
(Nestorianism); or it leads to a contradiction because it is saying that Christ is 
one "who" (a person) who possesses two "whos" (a divine and human person) 
that are united together under a single subject of reference (his person) but not 
mixed together into a new person; which, of course, is utter nonsense. Thus, in 
Severus' mind, in order to maintain the unity of Christ, one must deny the notion 
of two natures after the union. 
 
Our inquiry into the Monophysites’ rejection of the Council of Chalcedon 
may now be summarized. Both the Chalcedonians and the Monophysites were 
opposed to Nestorianism and Eutychianism, and each were trying to express the 
same thing about Christ; namely, he was consubstantial with God and 
consubstantial with mankind while remaining one unified person.  In order to 
combat these two heresies, the fathers at the Council of Chalcedon chose to 
distinguish between the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις. The Monophysites did not 
accept this distinction; and consequently, when the Monophysites heard the 
definition speak of Christ as having two natures, they understood it either as 
meaning two persons, despite the definition explicitly saying that Christ was a 
single unified person, or they understood it as leading to a contradiction. Thus, 
the Monophysites rejected the Council of Chalcedon not so much because of what 
the fathers present were trying to say about Christ’s incarnation but more 
because of how the fathers chose to express their understanding of the 
incarnation. 
 
Although the root of the Monophysite controversy was, at least in some 
respects, due to a difference in defining terms, one should not suppose that 
healing this schism is as easy as it might appear. The Monophysite controversy 
continued long after the council of Chalcedon and only started to die down after 
those lands, which were predominantly Monophysite, were conquered by the 
Moslem hordes. The Monophysites were condemned  as heretics at the next two 
Oecumenical councils: Constantinople II (553) and Constantinople III (680-681). 
Severus was also specifically condemned as a heretic at the latter council. The 
distinction made by the Chalcedonian definition between φύσις and ὑπόστασις 
laid the foundation for all subsequent orthodox theology, especially that in the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 63. 
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east - what would later become known as "Byzantine theology," which has 
certain distinctives not derivable from Monophysite Christology and therefore 
not acceptable to them. On a brighter note, however, the controversy does point 
to where the search for unity should start - not just unity between Chalcedonians 
and non-Chalcedonians but between all disparate Christian churches. Since we 
often times take for granted how we use and define certain terms, it is 
paramount that an agreement on terminology be reached by both opposing 
parties before discussing the issues that divide them so as to mitigate the chances 
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